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Overview 
We live today in a world where most people are poor and some are very rich, and the 
category in which you find yourself is largely determined not by your job, your age or your 
gender but by your location. Despite the fast economic growth of China and India over the past 
two decades, most people in the world today are very poor. Nearly 3 billion people live on less 
than $2 a day; almost 1 billion are illiterate. These numbers reflect the continuing wealth gaps 
between the West and the Rest of the world, as well as the burgeoning wealth gaps inside 
countries such as China and India, as well as in the developed world. 
          Although the data is contested, most economic historians would subscribe to the view that 
the large inequality between regions is relatively “new,” at least in historical terms. The timing, 
however, remains contentious. A broad consensus that incomes had diverged between Europe 
and China in the early modern period was disrupted around 2000 when Pomeranz put the term 
“the Great Divergence” into scholarly usage by suggesting that certain regions of China, India, 
and Western Europe were at broadly similar levels of agricultural productivity, commercial 
development and the ability of some firms to raise capital in the middle of the eighteenth 
century. The Great Divergence in wealth between the West and the Rest, then, began with the 
Industrial Revolution and the advent of modern economic growth in Britain.
2  
           The  Pomeranz  hypothesis  provoked  a surge of quantitative research on comparative 
income levels. Much of this research has suggested that income levels between Europe and Asia 
were already wide in the eighteenth century, and that this reflected trends which began at least 
three hundred years earlier. However it has also become clear that the real income gap was 
between the most advanced countries in Europe – Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium – the 2 
 
other regions, whether China, India or central and southern Europe. What happened during the 
nineteenth century was that much more of the West caught up to the advanced North Sea 
countries, but the Rest did not.
3 
             The large income gaps between the developed West and the Rest in 1914 does not mean 
that there was no convergence. As Bénétrix, O’Rourke and Williamson have shown, from the 
late nineteenth century the “periphery” began to follow the path of industrialization set in the 
West.
4 A number of Latin American countries began such “convergence” from the 1870s, 
followed by some Asian countries after 1890, followed by parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Middle East during the interwar years. However the emergence and growth of modern industrial 
sectors was not sufficient to close the substantial income gaps which had opened. Today the 
differentials between the West and most of the Rest remain substantial, even if recent decades 
has seen some convergence between China and other non-Western countries and the West. 
   Business historians have not been central to the debates about the Great Divergence. As 
an academic discipline, business historians have been primarily concerned to understand why 
Western countries, and subsequently Japan, grew wealthy. The most important contribution of 
this literature has been to identify the modern business enterprise as central to the economic 
performance of economies. Chandler documented the growth in nineteenth century America of 
large-scale corporations with professional managers, who he and others drove industrial 
innovation.
5 Much subsequent business history research has gone into testing this hypothesis, 
including exploring how, why and with what consequences, firms and business systems in other 
Western countries looked different from those in the United States.
6 There has been much less 
research on the converse of this situation: why, and with consequences, the entrepreneurs and 3 
 
firms in Latin America, Africa and most of Asia were so delayed in producing powerhouses of 
corporate innovation.  
In contrast economists, as well as other social scientists, have made major advances in 
understanding what kept countries poor as well as what made them rich, even if  the conclusions 
remain contested. During the 1970s North identified the role of institutions in providing the 
incentive structure of economies. He defined institutions quite broadly. He believed that they 
“consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).
7 Greif, another prominent 
institutionalist, defined them as “a system of rules, beliefs, norms and organizations that together 
generate a regularity of (social) behavior.”
8 In his more recent work, North himself has widened 
his own definitions of institutions even wider, and argued that responses to institutions are 
heavily conditioned by culturally conditioned mental models and religious beliefs. 
9 
In practice, the primary focus of attention has been systems of property rights. It has been 
asserted that societies that provide incentives and opportunities for investment will be richer than 
those that fail to do so, and that the protection of property rights was an essential incentive 
behind such investment. By reducing transactions costs and facilitating potential gains from 
exchange, institutions fuel productivity and growth. The literature has particularly favored the 
use of three proxies in particular for “institutions”: risk of expropriation; government 
effectiveness and constraints on the executive. North famously identified the Glorious 
Revolution in England in 1688 as providing the institutional arrangements which explain why 
that country had the Industrial Revolution.
10 
Although most economists now agree that inherited institutions matter for growth, 
however, they have disagreed on the nature of this institutional foundation. There has been a 4 
 
considerable emphasis in recent literature on impact of colonialism. Engerman and Sokoloff 
highlighted the impact of colonization in altering the composition of the populations.  In Latin 
America and Caribbean, soils and climates gave them a comparative advantage in growing crops 
for which they used slaves or natives. The resulting extreme inequality in distribution of wealth, 
they suggest, gave them institutions which contributed to persistence of substantial inequality. In 
North America, few Native Americans and climates and soils favored mixed farming and 
livestock with limited economies of scale in production got the right kind of institutions.
11 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson distinguished between institutions of “private 
property” and “extractive institutions”. The former provide secure property rights and are 
embedded in a broad cross-section of society. Extractive institutions concentrate power in the 
hands of a small elite and create a high risk of expropriation. These authors use this model to 
explain what they describe as the reversal of fortune between apparently affluent (as proxied by 
urbanization) Aztecs and Incas in Americas and Mughals in India, and little developed North 
America and Australia. They argue that this was caused by European colonialism. In prosperous 
and densely settle areas, Europeans introduced or maintained extractive institutions to force 
people to work in mines and plantations. In sparsely settled areas, Europeans settled and created 
institutions of private property. The spread of industrial technology in the nineteenth century 
required a broad mass of society to participate, so they won out.
12  
A different institutional perspective has come from the law and finance literature. 
Broadly these authors have argued that the legal tradition countries inherited or adopted in the 
distant past has a long-term effect on financial development. Countries that had a common law 
system had on average better investor protections that most civil law countries, and that French 
civil law countries were worse than German or Scandinavian civil law traditions. They suggest 5 
 
this had a major effect on financial development, which in turn can be assumed to have impacted 
the nature and speed of economic development.
13  
               A second explanation for wealth and poverty has focused on human capital. Thirty 
years ago Easterlin argued that the answer to why some societies underwent modern economic 
growth and others did not could be found in the amount of formal schooling provided by 
societies. Within Europe, the most advanced nations educationally, in northern and Western 
Europe, were the ones that developed first. Easterlin also speculated that the content of education 
matters, believing that secular and rationalistic was best.
14 Subsequently, Goldin has made a 
strong case for attributing American industrial leadership to the unique egalitarian mass 
provision of post elementary schooling achieved in the United States during the early twentieth 
century.
15 Scholars in the law and finance literature have accepted that human capital may be a 
more basic source of growth than institutions, and that growth and human capital accumulation 
lead to institutional improvement.
16 
     This economics literature has made great progress in developing new ways to measure 
and identify the causal effects of key variables, but it also has limitations. literature remains split 
on methods, data and interpretation. Much of the work can be criticized by its willingness not to 
overly engage with historical specifics. The focus on the impact of colonialism skirts around an 
unusually big elephant in the room often called the “Needham Puzzle” after one of the most 
prominent historians of technology in China: why did China not have an Industrial Revolution. 
Although poor institutions – “Oriental Despotism” – are often blamed for this, there is as much 
evidence that the Chinese state was benign or weak than that it was predatory. The widespread 
existence of market activities and the importance of private property in China would support 
such a view. At the very least, there were such considerable fluctuations over time in the 6 
 
effectiveness of governments in China, and in their relationship to market activities, that a 
monolithic “Oriental Despotism” explanation is not convincing.
17  
On a more conceptual level, the economics literature is heavily oriented towards 
measurement and causality. Knowing that political and legal institutions or human capital matter 
is important – but a further set of critical questions relate to how firms and entrepreneurs interact 
with these aspects of an economy. It is firms and entrepreneurs which create wealth and 
innovation, rather than governmental institutions or schools. Here the economics literature is less 
well-developed. Institutions and human capital are treated as the first order causes of economic 
growth. The assumption is that if a society evolves or adopts the right institutions, or else has 
good human capital investment, firms and entrepreneurs will more or less appear spontaneously 
and create economic growth. The business history literature suggests that this is a considerable 
over-simplification.  
This working paper seeks to incorporate the missing gap of firms and entrepreneurs into 
debates about the causes of global wealth and poverty. It is not intended here to revisit the 
extensive literature why the Industrial Revolution occurred first in Britain. Instead, the focus is 
more on why much of the Rest struggled to catch up. 
Are some countries just more entrepreneurial than others? 
             One reason why economists may not have spent much time thinking about the role of 
business enterprises in the Great Divergence is that there is not an interesting story to tell. Are 
some countries simply more entrepreneurial than others because of cultural factors? If the answer 
is yes, then there is no need to explore more complex mechanisms which may be at work. 
            The view that the culture was just wrong has been widely used to explain the Needham 
Puzzle. By the fourteenth century China had an advanced agriculture with high yields, a 7 
 
considerable knowledge of science and technology, a verge large iron and textile industry, and a 
high level of urbanization.
18 The only thing wrong, as Weber wrote in The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism, was the Chinese mindset.
19 Joseph Needham, whose research 
documented the achievements of pre-modern science and technology in China, came to the same 
view, as has more recently the economic historian Mokyr.
20   
This issue was also much discussed by earlier generations of business historians before 
the discipline became primarily focused on organizational issues during the 1960s. Between the 
late 1940s and the late 1950s the Center for Research in Entrepreneurial History at Harvard 
assembled an interdisciplinary group of scholars, including economists such as Joseph 
Schumpeter, North and young historians such as Chandler and David Landes, who pursued 
empirical studies on the rise of entrepreneurship in the transition to capitalism, examining the 
emergence and social conditioning of entrepreneurship in countries around the world. This 
stream of research resulted in a body of literature, focused on the historical development of 
entrepreneurship, which suggested that levels of entrepreneurship did vary significantly between 
countries.
21 For some, the reason lay in culture. In a classic early study, Landes argued that 
France’s allegedly poor economic performance in the nineteenth century could be attributed to 
the conservativeness of French entrepreneurs, who saw business as an integral part of family 
status rather than as an end in itself.
22 Landes continued throughout his career to make the case 
for the importance of national cultural factors, values, and social attitudes in explaining the 
development of entrepreneurial activity, and in turn the economic performance of nations.
23 The 
cultural failure argument appeared in many other debates. Gentrified and complacent British 
entrepreneurs in the Victorian Era proved a favorite subject for those interested in explaining the 
“relative decline” of the British economy.
24  8 
 
From the start there have been major criticisms of the cultural approach. It is known that 
in history peoples who shared similar cultures or beliefs had very different paths of development. 
Often the problem being explained was poorly specified. Landes’s search for why French 
entrepreneurs failed was launched without a clear understanding of what, if anything, had failed. 
Nineteenth century French industry is now regarded as a lot more technologically advanced than 
had been imagined.
25As the economist Alexander Gerschenkron noted, the notion of “national 
culture” envisioned in many studies was static and rigidly functionalist, making it difficult for 
them to truly account for the dynamic nature of entrepreneurial activity or for entrepreneurial 
change.
26 Schumpeter maintained that entrepreneurs often acted as agents of change rather than 
being captives of their environment. While national institutions and political boundaries, whether 
formal or informal, provide the environmental settings for entrepreneurial activity, Schumpeter 
insisted that they often revealed little about the ways in which new economic opportunities have 
been created and exploited.
27 
In short, while entrepreneurship is a scarce resource, it is at best insufficient to use 
inherent cultural differences to explain variations in entrepreneurial and economic performance 
between countries. This does not mean that variations in cultural and social values at particular 
points in time might not form part of an explanation why the economic performance of countries 
diverged. It does mean that such variations demand more complex explanations than inherent 
cultural differences. The paper now turns to examining the role of entrepreneurs and firms in 
creating wealth and poverty in the historical phases of globalization, constrained and re-
globalization since the second half of the nineteenth century.  
 
 9 
 
Creating Wealth and Poverty in the First Global Economy 
            The global integration of the markets for capital, commodities and people proceeded at a 
fast pace from the 1820s, and especially from the 1870s as transport and communications costs 
fell through technological advances, and political barriers to investment fell with the spread of 
both liberal political ideologies and Western imperialism. Globalization transformed national 
economies. While Western countries underwent rapid industrialization, countries in the South 
and Asia were turned them into major exporters of commodities and foodstuffs. The scale of 
transformation was sometimes enormous. India’s huge handicraft manufacturing industry lost its 
markets abroad and increasingly in major cities, and the country became instead a major primary 
commodity exporter. While tea had been barely grown in South Asia in the 1830s, India had 
become the world’s largest tea producer by 1900, as British firms both developed plantations and 
pursued innovative marketing strategies which overturned the previous dominance of Chinese 
tea from the world market.  
The domestic entrepreneurial response to these momentous economic shifts in most of 
Asia, Latin America and Africa was not strong. While many regions of Europe caught up with 
the home of modern industrialization around the North Sea, the Rest as a whole lagged over the 
course of the nineteenth century. This was surprising in some respects. There were strong 
commercial and market traditions in much of Asia and to some extent elsewhere. There were 
long-established handicraft industries in China and India, as well as deep commercial and 
financial institutions. Expatriate Chinese in Southeast Asia had good mining skills, and 
developed and dominated the tin mining industry in Malaya after 1848. Much of Latin America 
descended into decades of political turmoil and strife following independence from Spain in the 
early nineteenth century, but from mid-century stronger political units formed, and economic 10 
 
growth resumed, especially in the southern cone. Argentina eventually became one of the 
world’s fast-growing, and richest, economies.
28 Yet dynamic and innovative locally-owned firms 
were slow to emerge from these regions.  
So why was it entrepreneurs originating from Western countries which surged ahead of 
the Rest during the nineteenth century? The institutional argument that entrepreneurship was 
more likely to flourish in a country which protected property rights, did not expropriate and 
functioned effectively than in chaotic or rapacious regimes seen in some if not all of the non-
Western world, is a starting point, at least for countries outside colonial empires. But what was 
the exact relationship? A major insight is provided by Baumol’s work on the allocation of 
entrepreneurial activity. Two decades ago Baumol argued that the productive contribution of 
entrepreneurship varied because of the allocation between productive activities such as 
innovation and unproductive activities such as rent seeking or organized crime. This allocation, 
Baumol suggested, was in turn influenced by the relative pay offs offered by a society to such 
activities.
29 A subsequent large-scale collaborative research project provided much empirical 
historical support for this hypothesis, including a re-statement of the key typologies into 
productive or redistributive entrepreneurship.
30 
        The Mexican financial system from the late nineteenth century shows how this 
mechanism played out in one country by demonstrating how the existence of an undemocratic 
political system and selective enforcement of property rights shaped the financial and business 
system. Limited in its ability to raise taxes to finance infrastructure projects as well as fend off 
political opponents, Maurer has shown how the Mexican government of the dictator Porfirio 
Diaz relied on banks to provide credit, while the banks relied on the government to enforce 
property rights. A select few bankers were given extensive privileges producing a highly 11 
 
concentrated banking system. Each bank grew fat in its own protected niche. To overcome the 
problems associated with information asymmetry, banks lent to their own shareholders and other 
insiders. In the case of the textile industry, banks did not lend to the best firms, but the best-
connected firms. Poorly defined property rights prevented those excluded from the insider 
networks from pledging collateral and finding another financial route.
31 
            There were parallels in the more successful business sector in Argentina. During the late 
nineteenth century large business groups such as Bemberg and Tornquist grew rapidly. They 
diversified across commodities, processing, infrastructure, and consumer goods manufacturing. 
These large and successful businesses were productive in Baumol’s terms, opening up new 
industries, and driving the country’s fast development at the time. From another perspective, 
however, there impact was redistributive. They build businesses on the basis of concessions from 
the government, and devoted considerable energy to political contacts. They were also heavily 
engaged in financial transactions and networks. As industries developed, they opted to continue 
importing heavy machinery rather than face the cost of investing in making such machines 
themselves, and in training skilled workers. As a result, the technological capabilities of the 
country remained basic.
32  
             As studies of nineteenth century Mexico and elsewhere, have shown, as the West pulled 
away, technological catch-up was a huge entrepreneurial challenge. The new advanced 
technologies of the West were embedded in quite different institutional, economic and social 
contexts than in the Rest. Entrepreneurs could not simply import them and they would work. 
Factor endowments fundamentally shaped the commercial viability of different transferred 
technologies.
33 Relevant technologies needed to be identified, they need to be adapted, they 
needed to be financed, and they needed to be used. This was hugely challenging, although not 12 
 
impossible.
34 This explains, in part, why there were such significant regional differences in 
entrepreneurial performance in many nineteenth century Latin American countries, despite 
having the same institutions at the national level.
35  
    Conversely, getting the institutions right is often regarded as a key factor behind Japan’s 
unusually successful entry into modern economic growth following the Meiji Restoration in 
1868. The resource-poor island nation of Japan seemed an unlikely candidate for economic 
success. The institutional heritage of the country seemed to make such success even less likely. 
During the sixteenth century Japan’s Shogun military rulers had largely closed the country to 
foreign trade, expelled foreigners, and imposed a strict feudal regime. This regime had remained 
in place for centuries before the US navy ships of Commodore Perry had turned up in Tokyo 
harbor in 1853 demanding that the country open itself up for foreign trade. The Meiji Restoration 
was effectively a coup by lower samurai, a sub-elite group, based in a few outlying regions of the 
country, who were determined to resist Western incursion into the country. The new Japanese 
government moved rapidly, and in the face of rebellions by disaffected former members of the 
feudal elite, to create a modern institutional infrastructure, including a parliamentary system, a 
central bank and a legal system, by explicitly copying institutions in the Western countries.              
               The institutional reforms of the Meiji era resemble a Baumol-approved strategy for 
generating a supply of productive rather than redistributive entrepreneurship.
36 Yet the 
institutional framework constructed in Meiji Japan was surely not one which many of today’s 
institutional theorists would favor. Despite appearances, they were not embedded in a broad 
cross-section of society – indeed their basic purpose was to extract resources from the mass of 
the people in order to take the country on a forced march of rapid industrialization, and to wage 
war on and colonize neighboring countries. 13 
 
In part, the growth of modern entrepreneurship within this institutional context might be 
ascribed to the pre-industrial commercial heritage of the country, where a market economy had 
flourished despite the feudal regime and closed economy. A number of the family owned 
zaibatsu or business groups which drove modern industrial growth, notably Mitsui, drew on such 
long-established business traditions. Mitsui had been founded as early as 1673 as a clothing 
retailer. Yet the firm’s subsequent growth as well as new entrants such as Iwasaki Yataro’s 
shipping company Mitsubishi was driven by political patronage. In order to support the 
government’s colonial expansion plans and suppress internal rebellions, Mitsubishi was given 
ships, credit and protection against foreign shipping companies by governments during the 
1870s. Business-government relations seem closer to nineteenth century Mexico than to the 
United States, although there was a great deal more tension between Yataro and the government 
than between the Mexican business elite and Diaz.
37 
          Closer examination of the “institutional arrangements” which promoted growth in many 
countries in the first global economy raise many questions about the “right” and “wrong” 
institutions to promote entrepreneurship and firm growth. For example, protection of intellectual 
property rights and patents would appear important to promote entrepreneurship from an 
institutional perspective. Yet the evidence that patents in Britain played an important role in the 
Industrial Revolution and later is weak. The cost of obtaining a patent in eighteenth century 
Britain was high, and they were difficult to enforce.
38 Later aspiring nineteenth century Dutch 
entrepreneurs were able to build businesses in more technologically advanced industries because 
of the lack of patent protection afforded to foreign companies in those countries.
39 Indeed, 
Moser’s review of the historical evidence strongly suggests that in countries with patent laws the 
majority of innovations have occurred outside of the patent system, while conversely countries 14 
 
without patent laws produced as many innovations as countries with patent laws during the same 
time periods, and their innovations were of comparable quality.
40 
            There  are  other  important  examples when empirical research has challenged the 
correlation between institutions and entrepreneurship seem. It was plausible to suggest, for 
example, that the emergence of larger-scale Chinese business during the nineteenth century was 
handicapped by the absence of company law and limited liability. Finally, in the Company Law 
passed in 1904 provided the legislative framework for modern business. On closer examination, 
however, it turns out that the law was a culmination of trend which had been underway for 
several decades to facilitate the raising of outside capital. Moreover few Chinese companies 
registered under the act when it was passed. Most entrepreneurs continued to rely on their own 
and their family funds.
41 In the case of Brazil in the same period, Musacchio has raised serious 
doubts concerning the adverse impact of civil law regimes on financial and economic 
development. Brazil was a French civil law country with apparently inadequate creditor 
protection and contract enforcement, but he found that Brazilian firms used their own byelaws to 
offer strong protection for equity investors. The country developed a very strong corporate bond 
market before 1914, which then shrank in importance despite continued creditor protection.
42  
The role of colonialism poses the most serious challenge to institutional explanations of 
variations in the allocation of entrepreneurial energy. Colonialism forms an important element of 
the institutional economics explanation for the lack of growth in developing countries, but much 
of the treatment is ahistorical. Colonialism changed greatly over time, but most attention is given 
to the highly exploitative first stages of European colonialism. While colonialism is from today’s 
perspective wholly unacceptable, there was a huge difference between Spanish conquistadores in 
the sixteenth century looting the Aztec and Inca empires, and pious (if racist) late Victorian 15 
 
British colonial officials in India and Africa. There was a huge difference between those 
Victorian officials and their rapacious eighteenth century predecessors in the East India 
Company. The policy regime of empires changed over time. While traditional Indian handicraft 
industries suffered from British free trade policies in the nineteenth century, during the interwar 
decades British India was protectionist, including against British imports. In general, empire was 
a heterogeneous rather than a homogeneous phenomenon. British colonies got common law 
systems, while French colonies got civil law systems, with all the consequent different alleged 
effects on corporate governance. In Africa, while the vast Belgian possessions in the Congo in 
the late nineteenth century have long been regarded as a prime example of worst-case 
exploitative imperialism, in the British colonies the relationship between the colonial 
administration and expatriate business were much more distant and nuanced.
43 
The late nineteenth century British colonial regime is especially interesting for its impact 
on entrepreneurship. The British brought not only political stability, but their legal system with 
protection of property rights and contract enforcement. The empire even offered the prospect of 
upward social advancement for highly successful business leaders of any ethnicity. Ethnic 
Indian, Jewish, Chinese and other diaspora moved within the imperial umbrella, frequently being 
co-opted into the British imperial system. By the late nineteenth century Indian and others were 
being given Knighthoods.
44 In 1892 Dadabhai Naoroji, an Indian, became the first Asian elected 
to the British House of Commons.  
          This raises a puzzle why the response to modern economic growth by entrepreneurs in 
India was muted. The British administrators in India not only introduced British company laws, 
they simplified and codified them in ways which appear to have made them even more 
enterprise-friendly. The British Raj also operated a laissez-faire, low tax policy regime.
45 Yet 16 
 
when investments began in large-scale industry from the mid-nineteenth century, they were 
highly clustered geographically and ethnically. Scotsmen developed the modern jute industry of 
Calcutta from the 1860s, whilst the tiny ethnic minority of Parsees developed the textile 
industries on the west coast. Modern indigenous entrepreneurship became, and has remained, 
highly concentrated ethnically, with the Marwaris originating from Rajasthan and the Vanias 
from Gujerat joining the Parsees as the dominant entrepreneurial groups at least until the second 
global economy.
46 It would certainly be possible to construct an argument that colonialism and 
the institutional racism that went with it impacted entrepreneurial cognition. In crude terms, 
entrepreneurs who were not white men from Western countries may have felt less qualified to 
pursue opportunities, even if they were not. However this does not readily explain why some 
ethnic groups became dynamic entrepreneurs in India. 
There are some puzzles, therefore, about the historical relationship between institutions 
and entrepreneurship is not wholly straightforward, therefore, and the same goes if we explore 
the relationship with human capital. In striking contrast to Goldin’s description of education in 
early twentieth century America, many countries in nineteenth century Asia, Latin America and 
Africa had limited formal education provision largely confined to the elites. This may have 
affected the supply of domestic entrepreneurship in many non-Western countries in the 
nineteenth century. There is a large literature on developed countries on the importance of 
professional managerial cadres as firms grew, and of the role of educational institutions in the 
background of such managers. Poor educational levels for the mass of the population also made 
the management of labor far more difficult because of poor skill levels and low productivity. The 
lack of a theory of the supply of entrepreneurship means that the exact impact of low human 
capital development on the level and allocation of entrepreneurship is less clear cut. It is 17 
 
probably safe to assume, however, that extreme social inequality, poor literacy levels and lack of 
technical education reduced the available pool of productive entrepreneurs in many countries. In 
the case of colonial India, the high cost of skilled labor has been identified as one important 
reason, alongside other resource constraints including the high cost of capital, why the country 
remained inclined to small-scale traditional manufacture.
47 
The quality of Japanese human capital development was plausibly an important driver of 
the faster development of modern entrepreneurship and management there. Japan had achieved 
high literacy levels well before Perry arrived in 1853. The Meiji regime enacted compulsory 
primary education in 1872, before Britain and many other Western countries, and established the 
first Western-style universities soon afterwards. The zaibatsu were recruiting large numbers of 
university graduates as managers by the 1900s.
48  
Much still remains to be understood about the relationship between education, 
entrepreneurship and managerial effectiveness. In nineteenth century Europe, Sweden’s high 
educational levels even when it was very poor, peripheral economy has been widely regarded 
important in enabling the country to “catch up” as the century progressed.
49 Yet eighteen and 
nineteenth China had widespread literacy which did not translate into modern economic 
growth.
50 Argentina’s fast economic growth during the first global economy can be correlated 
with the highest literacy rate in Latin America. In 1900 the country’s literacy rate of 52 per cent 
was far above Mexico’s 22 per cent and Brazil’s 25 per cent, if far lower than the literacy rates of 
the United States and Canada.
51 Yet such educational attainments could not prevent the country’s 
subsequent poor economic performance for the remainder of the twentieth century.  
Nor can human capital be treated as entirely exogenous to firms. Early Japanese 
industrialization was plagued by skill shortages. Japanese firms responded with in-house 18 
 
training, beginning with shipyards in the 1890s. In turn, a better trained workforce was able to 
learn and diffuse techniques from abroad. Centuries of seclusion left Japan with a lack of 
knowledge of foreign countries and languages. One response was the institutional innovation of 
using specialist trading companies to engage in importing and exporting. These giant firms, 
based on the British trading companies in Asia, rationed scarce managerial resources and 
provided a means to share knowledge about foreign markets and sources of supply.
52  
This brief survey of the historical evidence suggests that neither institutions nor human 
capital are fully discrete, and that historical case studies provide different answers to the question 
about what matters most. There are likely to have been other factors at work also. To have 
entrepreneurship, there must be entrepreneurial opportunities. The growth and size of the 
American market provides a key component of the Chandlerian explanation for the emergence of 
large integrated firms in the United States. It seems plausible that both in the case of Britain, the 
first industrializer, and Japan, the first successful non-Western catch-up, identification of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, and the building of managerial structures which permitted their 
exploitation, was facilitated by geographically compact domestic markets and unusually large 
capital cities. 
The market opportunities for firms and entrepreneurs in most of Asia, Latin America and 
Africa were more constrained. They often faced great difficulties if they wanted to sell beyond 
their local markets because of poor transport and communications infrastructure. In India, market 
conditions have been identified as one explanation why India’s powerful and rich merchants in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries left manufacturing in the hands of small artisans, 
pointing to fragmented markets, inadequate transport infrastructure, lawlessness and disregard 
for property rights.
53 These constraints were relaxed as the British colonial regime imposed 19 
 
political stability and promoted transport infrastructure, but a well-established argument in the 
literature on nineteenth century India has maintained that the small scale of the domestic market 
retarded the growth of a modern machinery industry.
54 
Yet it was often foreign firms, or ethnic minorities, which took advantage of expanding 
opportunities. There may well have been an issue of entrepreneurial cognition.  Most local 
entrepreneurs may not have been well-informed about the pace of change in advanced 
economies, and less knowledgeable about their markets, including the market for skilled 
expertise. Language may have been a factor. A lack of English-speaking ability might have 
constrained access advanced knowledge in Latin America. The former imperial powers, Spain 
and Portugal, were in the backward south of Europe, and were not good role models of modern 
industrial growth.  
Despite the criticism earlier of the overgeneralizations and stereotypes found in the broad 
cultural explanations of entrepreneurial performance, there has been a renewed interest in the 
view that cultural values are likely to have framed cognition and exploitation of opportunities. 
North’s search for explanations of the “wide and still widening gap between rich and poor 
countries” has led him to consider the importance of immensely varied cultures with different 
combinations of supernatural beliefs and institutions.”
55 The problem remains how to really test 
such a hypothesis against historical evidence. Cross-cultural management theory offer one 
avenue, by showing how cultures both differ in core values, and how this affects (if not 
determines) business organization and firm strategies. Hofstede’s classic study identified four 
dimensions of culture which differed between countries: readiness to tolerate inequality (Power 
Distance); tolerance for uncertainty (Uncertainty Avoidance); relationships between the 
individual and the collective (Individualism); and attitudes towards gender roles (Masculinity). 20 
 
Hofstede added a new dimension of “Long-Term Orientation” during the late 1980s, followed by 
a sixth dimension called Indulgence versus Restraint in 2010.
56 
It is not implausible to believe, if challenging to demonstrate robustly, that the northern 
European and Anglo-Saxon combination of individualism and tolerance for uncertainty yielded 
advantages to their firms in entrepreneurial endeavors over those in many developing countries, 
especially at the time when starting new industries was quite risky. It is believed, for example, 
that Chinese mining firms lost out to Western firms in early twentieth century Malaya because 
they did not want to risk making large capital investments in new technologies.
57 Of course it is 
debatable if the cultural characteristics identified by Hofstede, which is based on a study of a 
large number of IBM employees in 1980, bear much relationship to the cultural values in the 
nineteenth century. It is known that cultural characteristics change slowly because they are 
passed on through child-rearing practices, but it is also known that exogenous shocks and in 
some cases government policies can shift cultural values.  
   Mark Casson has gone furthest in identifying the features of societies which may cause 
them to differ in their receptiveness of entrepreneurship. He defines an “entrepreneurial culture” 
using theories of entrepreneurship that emphasize the functions of innovation, risk-bearing, and 
arbitrage. Entrepreneurial cultures, he proposes, can thus be defined in terms of attributes – such 
as scientific and systems thinking – that promotes or retards these functions in a society. Cultural 
differences towards information and “trust” levels may have been especially important in 
explaining variations in the quality of entrepreneurial judgments.
58   
It is evident that business enterprises in many non-Western societies were often 
challenged to grow beyond a certain size because their societies found it hard to “trust” non-
family members as either managers or equity holders. Japan was an unusual society where 21 
 
“blood ties” were not decisive in determining trust levels. Arguably, the rapid Japanese move to 
employing professional managers may have reflected cultural traditions of adopting sons. In 
science-based industries, in which the optimal scale of production is large, a willingness to 
employ professional managers became important. Chandler famously ascribed British relative 
decline against the United States in the late nineteenth century to a preference for family firms 
rather than professional management. As originally constructed, however, the argument has 
attracted much criticism, and indeed spurred a vibrant literature on the merits of family owned 
and managed business.
59  
The early literature from the Harvard Center and others on entrepreneurs and firms in 
non-Western countries was weakened by assumptions that deviations from American managerial 
practices should be a priori regarded as a sign of failure, or evidence of irrational cultural values. 
Much of the early literature on Latin American entrepreneurship in the nineteenth century 
blamed lack of economic growth on an alleged commercial and speculative ethos of the region’s 
entrepreneurs. The diversified business groups which appeared during and after the nineteenth 
century in Latin America and elsewhere were regarded as inherently inefficient, and driven by 
social and political motivations rather than business logic. However, while the predominance of 
family owned diversified business groups with strong links to political elites is uncontested, later 
research has provided a better understanding of the rationality behind organizational structures 
such as diversified business groups arising from weaknesses in capital markets, shortage of 
managerial resources, and high transactions costs. Within such conditions, business groups can, 
and often are, often the most effective forms of business organization. In other words, they are 
more characterized as examples of productive than redistributive entrepreneurship.
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Somewhat similarly, Indian firms in the newly created modern textile industry of the 
mid-nineteenth century innovated institutionally by abandoning the partnership form favored by 
their British counterparts and forming joint stock companies linked into wider groups by equity, 
debt and cross-directorships. The resulting “managing agency” system, long disparaged in the 
literature as an idiosyncratic morass of conflicts of interest, is now seen as an effective 
organizational response to economic conditions, and subsequently copied by British expatriate 
firms active in India. 
61  
Indeed, as entrepreneurs in developing countries began catching-up with their Western 
counterparts, they were often successful in developing hybrid organizational forms well-adapted 
to their local contexts. In China, the new modern business enterprises which appeared in early 
twentieth century typically combined the formal organization of Western-style corporations with 
traditional, well-established business practices from China’s pre-industrial past.  A study of the 
rapid growth of Shanghai’s print machinery industry from the late nineteenth century has shown 
that in this industry, unlike others such as textiles, Chinese entrepreneurs were so successful that 
they were able to replace foreign machine imports with products from the local machine 
industry.
62 
However, the pre-eminence of ethnic and religious minorities in entrepreneurial activity 
does point towards some combination of cultural and institutional explanations of retarded 
entrepreneurship. As many Asian, African and Latin American countries began to industrialize, 
minorities or immigrants were especially important in new firm creation. These included Chinese 
in south-east Asian, Indians in east Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, Italians in Argentina, and 
French in Mexico.
63 Their success was often ascribed to particular ethical or working practices, 
but their role is more plausibly explained as a demonstration of the challenges faced by 23 
 
entrepreneurs in societies where trust levels were poor, information flows inadequate, institutions 
weak and capital scarcity. In such situations, small groups with shared values held major 
advantages as entrepreneurs. If in addition, they established an intermediary role between “more 
local locals” and Western firms, they could secure easier access to knowledge and information, 
from and about, Western countries. 
 The prominent role of a few groups in modern industry in India from the nineteenth 
century has received much attention. The importance of the tiny Parsee community around 
Bombay has been variously described as the result of close relations with the colonial authorities, 
“outsider” minority status, and a “Protestant” style work ethic.
64 The Marwaris were far less 
close to the British. Indeed, a number of families, like the Bajaj who financed and supported 
Gandhi’s campaign of non-resistance against the British, were active in the Independence 
struggle. Other explanations have been found in unique cost accounting methods and the work 
ethos which seems to feature in most accounts of minority successes.
65  
Wolcott has combined both cultural and institutional factors to explain the pre-eminence 
of Indian minorities. She relates the situation to India’s caste system, and argues that the payoffs 
to entrepreneurship differed across caste lines. Members of the moneylending and trading castes 
like the Marwaris could enforce contracts through reputation and membership deterred cheating. 
As a result, they were efficient at providing financial and other resources to entrepreneurs within 
their own castes. However, the large number of potential entrepreneurs outside these groups 
lacked privileged access to these informal financial networks, reducing their incentives to engage 
in productive entrepreneurship.
66 
The ethnic clustering in modern entrepreneurship in India, and elsewhere, was striking, 
but as Roy has suggested, another way to look at such clustering was geographically. Before 24 
 
1914 Bombay and Calcutta accounted for half the modern factories in India, and even more of 
related services such as banking and insurance. Unlike other cities in India, they had grown 
through the activities of the East India Company, and were outward-oriented and cosmopolitan. 
In these two port cities, Roy observes, “modern Indian business enterprise and business families 
congregated and recreated a globalized world with strong Indian characteristics.” 
67 
The emergence of hubs such as Bombay, and modern entrepreneurship in general,  took 
place within the context of the wider political economy environment. With perhaps the single 
exception of Britain in the eighteenth century, governments have contributed to entrepreneurship 
and firm growth not only by providing (or not providing) institutional rules of the game, but 
through a wide range of policy measures. The role of the state in catching up economic 
backwardness has been debated since the writings of Gershenkron decades ago.
68 However, the 
ways in which governments facilitated entrepreneurial perception and exploitation of 
opportunities has not been the primary emphasis of this research. Yet it is difficult to account for 
the rapid economic growth of the United States in the nineteenth century without mentioning 
government policy. The Federal government purchased, or annexed, much of the territory of the 
present day country, and then largely gave it away. State governments were active promoters of 
infrastructure investment. High levels of tariff protection widened the market opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and firms by shutting out cheaper imports from Europe.
69 The Japanese 
government was prevented by Western countries from tariff protection, but it subsidized the first 
modern factories before privatizing them. It distorted markets by favoring zaibatsu through 
subsidies and the allocation of business. The government was not center-stage in the first wave 
of Meiji industrialization, as many of its interventions were poorly managed or not purposeful, 
but it provided a broadly favorable context for entrepreneurship.
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We can see the impact of the wider political economy in other settings. Explanations for 
why ethnic Chinese business became disproportionately important in Southeast Asia typically 
stress cultural factors, including the role of family, dialect groups and the Confucian value 
system. With respect to the latter, it has often been argued that social trust, the social obligations 
that bind family and lineage, was strengthened by the Confucian belief, and that provided the 
bedrock of commercial networking. Yet while some or all of these features may be significant, 
the growth of Chinese entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia also has to be placed within a wider 
political economy context. From the fourteenth century, the region’s rulers favored foreign over 
local merchants because the latter might pose a political threat. Through the seventeenth century 
local trading communities, whether Malay or Filipino, continued to flourish, but the Chinese role 
was strengthened by the arrival of Western merchants, for the Chinese positioned themselves as 
intermediaries. By the late nineteenth century, the Chinese had secured the position of revenue 
farmers across the region, both in colonial and non-colonial areas. This made them indispensable 
for local and colonial governments, while providing a source of funds for their business 
interests.
71 
There are other examples of the importance of public policy in shaping entrepreneurial 
opportunities and outcomes in the nineteenth century. Take the fundamental shift in comparative 
advantage in the global copper industry away from Chilean dominance in the mid-nineteenth 
century to US dominance by the 1890s. By the end of the century, US firms were not only out-
competing Chilean ones in the export market for copper but were also undertaking FDI in 
production in South America. The competitive advantage of US firms was developed by an array 
of public policies that supported the development of the infant industry in the United States. 26 
 
Industrial mining and smelting of copper prospered in the nineteenth century not because of free 
enterprise, but precisely its opposite, which was the extent and quality of government.
72 
Conversely, when local governments were able to change the rules of the game for their 
firms, the result was often if not always the creation of productive business enterprises. Take the 
case of late nineteenth century Uruguay. Its banking market had been dominated by British 
banks. However in 1896 a local bank was formed which the government gave the sole right of 
note issue. By 1914 it had captured a large share of the domestic banking market. This formed 
part of a wider story of the growth of viable and successful locally owned banks in Latin 
America. In Argentina, a first wave of local banks failed disastrously in the early 1890s. 
However a second generation, which explicitly adopted many of the prudent lending practices 
which characterized British banks and combined them with more entrepreneurial policies of 
opening numerous branches, was much more successful and by 1914 had captured well over half 
the Argentinian banking market.
73 
Less direct forms of geopolitical power also played a growing role in expanding 
opportunities for international entrepreneurs from powerful countries, especially after the turn of 
the century. For instance, “Dollar Diplomacy,” an official US government policy first 
implemented in the early twentieth century, provided State Department support for US 
enterprises operating in Latin America. Such diplomatic (and often implicit military) backing 
was often important for entrepreneurs and firms making large fixed investments abroad or in 
negotiating special concessions from a host government. In the case of certain forms of cross-
border entrepreneurship, such as in natural resources, infrastructure, and agriculture, diplomatic 
influence and assistance were often critical for attaining the kinds concessions needed to do 
business.
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It was within the context of Western geo-political power that European and US firms 
surged abroad to the Rest looking for commodities and markets. By 1914 world FDI was not 
only substantial compared to world output, it was also primarily located in the non-Western 
world. Latin America and Asia were especially important as host regions, representing 33 and 21 
per cent respectively of the total world stock of FDI.
75 If domestic entrepreneurship in many 
developing countries struggled to get traction, it needs to be explained why foreign 
entrepreneurship did not exercise a more productive effect on local business systems.  
The industrial composition of this FDI provides a partial answer. Possibly one half of 
total world FDI was invested in natural resources, and a further one-third in services, especially 
financing, insuring, transporting commodities and foodstuffs. Manufacturing FDI primarily went 
to serve the markets of the West, whilst most FDI in the Rest was either in resources or services. 
Yet the establishment and maintenance of mines, oil fields, plantations, shipping depots, 
and railroad systems involved the transfer of packages of organizational and technological 
knowledge to host economies. Given the absence of appropriate infrastructure in developing 
countries, foreign enterprises frequently not only introduced technologies specific to their 
activities, but also social technologies such as police, postal and education systems. Insofar that 
lack of financial resources handicapped local firms, foreign banks contributed to building 
modern financial infrastructures. The British overseas banks which operated in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America may have been focused on trade finance and found it safer to lend to expatriates 
than locals, whose creditworthiness was hard to assess, but they were  more flexible in their 
lending policies than had once been thought.
76 Moreover it is not evident that availability of 
finance was the major handicap to entrepreneurship in the Rest. There were high levels of 28 
 
Chinese investment in foreign shipping and insurance companies, banks, and manufacturing 
companies before 1914, and Chinese business men sat on the boards of companies.
77                     
Perhaps a greater positive impact came from the building of transport and distribution 
infrastructure which enabled entrepreneurs to access world markets for the first time. British, 
French and other civil engineering and construction firms built railroads, ports and harbor 
facilities, bridges, urban sanitation systems, dams, electricity and gas works all over Latin 
America, Asia and parts of Africa. Between the late nineteenth century and 1914 residents of 
most of the world’s cities were provided with access to electricity, in their homes or at work, or 
else in the form of street lighting.
78 A global communications network based on submarine 
cables was put in place. In so far as access to markets had been a constraint, these investments 
relieved it. 
However spillovers and linkages to local entrepreneurs were limited by the nature of 
global capitalism at the time. Many natural resource investments were enclavist. Minerals and 
agricultural commodities were exported with only the minimum of processing. Most value was 
added to the product in the developed economies. Foreign firms were large employers of labor at 
that time, but training was only provided to local employees to enable them to fill unskilled or 
semiskilled jobs The French-controlled Suez Company, which built and operated the Suez Canal 
in Egypt between 1854 and 1956, had a major stimulus on the Egyptian economy, but until 1936 
the Egyptian staff was almost exclusively unskilled workers.
79  
The nature of the industries and these employment practices meant that the diffusion of 
organizing and technological skills to host economies was far less than to developed economies. 
Diffusion worked best when there were already established firms which could be stimulated to 
become more competitive by foreign firms, or had the capacity to absorb workers who moved on 29 
 
from foreign firms. This was the case in Japan, where – for example – the long established textile 
machinery manufacturer Toyoda was able to recruit workers from the US auto companies Ford 
and General Motors in the interwar years to build its new Toyota subsidiary. The process was 
facilitated by nationalistic government policies focused on removing the US-owned firms from 
the country.
80 
Nor were foreign companies typically transformers of domestic institutions. While 
theoretically they may have been channels to transfer aspects of the institutional arrangements in 
their home countries to their hosts, for the most part they reinforced local institutions. This was 
most directly seen in the concession system. In order to entice firms to make investments in 
mines, railroads, and so on, foreign firms were often given large concessions often involving 
freedom from taxation and other requirements over very long periods. It is not easy to imagine 
alternative options. Local entrepreneurs typically lacked knowledge of and access to foreign 
markets where these products were sold. They ability to hire foreign managers was constrained 
by reputation as much as by capital. However in some cases local dictators also preferred to give 
contracts and concessions to foreign entrepreneurs than to local entrepreneurs for domestic 
reasons, not wishing to build up powerful domestic rivals.  
Concessions worked to lock-in already sub-optimal institutional arrangements even when 
they had positive economic outcomes. In Mexico, President Diaz’s contracts and concessions to 
the British engineering contractor Weetman Pearson was effective in securing major 
infrastructure improvements in railroads, ports and the drainage of Mexico City, and Pearson 
also laid the basis for the successful Mexican oil industry.Yet Pearson’s very success 
strengthened the autocratic and crony capitalist regime of Diaz.
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Elsewhere the downsides of the concession system were even more apparent. A prime 
example is the malign influence of United Fruit, the US banana company, in central American 
countries such as Guatemala. This country had emerged as an independent nation in 1821 with 
an unequal social hierarchy based on race. The white population was positioned at the top, 
owned the majority of the land and controlled the political system through a series of dictators. 
The second class consisted of so-called “ladinos”—the mixed-race population or Westernized 
Indians. At the bottom was the majority of the population, composed of Mayan descendants. 
Guatemala had an unstable political system after independence from Spain in 1821. In 1898, 
General Manuel Estrada Cabrera took power, and stayed in power by repeated re-elections of 
questionable legitimacy until 1920. During his presidency, he encouraged investment in 
infrastructure, promoted export of goods, and gave United Fruit its first concessions for banana 
cultivation. The country was transformed into a “banana republic” with bananas dominating the 
export economy. Cabrera and his successors saw United Fruit as a vehicle to modernize the 
country through its investments in railroads, telegraph lines, housing, as well as plantations. 
However the plantation system also re-inforced the unequal social structures in Guatemala, 
which served as a massive obstacle to the development of a more entrepreneurial culture. 
Moreover, because the position of United Fruit was supported by the United States government, 
change was made even harder to achieve. When during the early 1950s the democratically 
elected government of Jacobo Arbenz sought to achieve agrarian reform, with the specific aim of 
developing a market economy, it was overthrown in a CIA-inspired coup, a military dictator put 
in its place, and United Fruit restored to its lands.
82  
The nature of the first global economy, then, meant that there was limited diffusion of 
entrepreneurship and organizing capabilities from Western firms in developing countries. Their 31 
 
primary impact was often to lock-in countries as resource providers, and to reinforce institutional 
constraints on domestic entrepreneurship rather than removing them. This partly explains why 
the domestic entrepreneurial response to globalization was weaker than might have been 
imagined, which at its heart lay in a lagged understanding of the opportunities offered by the new 
global economy combined with problems building effective business organizations which could 
absorb foreign technological and organizational skills. Public policy was one way to break 
constraints on local entrepreneurs – it was certainly effective in promoting the growth of the 
United States - but few governments in developing countries had either the autonomy or the 
capacity to pursue effective public policies.  
However by 1914 the evidence, patchy as it might be, suggests that the lag was being 
addressed in India, China, and some countries in Latin America. The business enterprises being 
built, whether Japanese zaibatsu, Latin American business groups or hybrid Chinese 
manufacturing firms, were often not US-style managerial corporations, but they were quite 
effective responses to local conditions.  
Globalization Constrained  
The outbreak of World War 1 in 1914 began a process which saw the meltdown of the 
first global economy. The levels of integration in capital and commodity markets fell back 
sharply to levels seen in the mid-nineteenth century. During the 1930s high tariffs and tight 
exchange controls closed down the global economy in favor of regional trading blocs and 
currency areas. This represented a reversal of globalization. There was a new interest in the 
nationality of ownership, and a growing resentment beyond the West in the ownership of assets 
by foreign firms. The Russian Revolution in 1917 was followed by the sequestration of foreign 
property. By the 1930s political nationalism was rampant. The Mexican nationalization of 32 
 
foreign oil companies in 1938 was a landmark event which asserted national sovereignty over 
natural resources.
83 It is less evident if the term de-globalization is fully justified. De Grazia has 
explored how the global consumer culture which had emerged during the late nineteenth century 
continued to expand and deepen during the interwar years.
84 Miller’s study of the maritime world 
of shipping, trading and ports identified continuities throughout the era of so-called de-
globalization.
85 Business historians have also showed how multinational investment persisted 
through the 1930s, and took new forms such as cartels. The term constrained globalization might 
be a better description.
86 
In part, the growth of policy restrictions global capitalism should be seen as the result of 
a revolt of the people who had not done well out of the globalization of the previous decades. 
Nineteenth century-style global capitalism had made some Western countries rich, and left the 
remainder more aware that they were relatively poor. It had frequently strengthened inequalities, 
and had locked countries into positions of being resource providers. There were many other 
losers, such as the peoples subject to the indignities of colonialism, and Muslims who perceived 
their religion and its values were denigrated by Western colonialism. 
            The  two  world  wars  and  the  Great Depression caused enormous damage to global 
welfare, but were not without their benefits for entrepreneurs and firms in developing countries. 
It expanded market opportunities for such firms by cutting supplies from Europe, or protecting 
local firms from foreign competition. Japan’s precocious modern industrial growth, underwritten 
by large state spending, was rescued from a likely meltdown by World War 1, which enabled its 
textile and other industries could break into other Asian markets. In India, and other European 
colonies, the War accelerated a shift of political power to local people as nationalism accelerated. 
Foreign firms for the first time began to consider Indians and Africans for filling managerial 33 
 
posts – not through a sudden conversion to the merits of diversity in the workforce, but because 
they were short of money and locals were cheaper than expatriates. 
       There was a strong growth of Indian-owned business from the World War 1. Modern 
industrialization spread from the small confines of parts of Western and eastern India to many 
other regions of India. A major turning point was the entry of the Marwaris into industry. During 
the War Ghanshyam Das Birla led the Marwari community into its first sustained manufacturing 
investments. He was offended by the racism he encountered from the British, but he also studied 
and learned from them about modern business methods. During the interwar years the Marwaris 
and others greatly expanded their manufacturing investments, sometimes by buying the shares of 
British companies. Indian entrepreneurs invested in new industries such as sugar, paper, shipping 
and chemicals, and challenged the British incumbents in jute and coal.
87  
               There  was  also  a  significant growth of modern Chinese entrepreneurship, despite 
numerous institutional and infrastructure failings, and the determined efforts of the Nationalist 
governments of the interwar years to regulate and control the economy.
88 Zhang Jian founded the 
Dasheng textile mills in Nantong in 1895, and this business evolved during the interwar years 
into a diversified business group in textiles, flour and oil milling, land development and 
shipping.
89 In a study of the pharmaceutical and Chinese medicine industry, Cochran has shown 
how Chinese entrepreneurs employed innovative advertising, retailing and other strategies to 
build large businesses both in China and in Southeast Asia.
90 
   There was evidence in the Middle East, too, of local entrepreneurs establishing modern 
business enterprises. In Egypt, under British occupation from the 1880s, new entrepreneurs were 
drawn from diverse nationalities, including Egyptian and British, became active in economic 
diversification and industrialization, often in quite imaginative ways. Bank Misr was the creation 34 
 
of Egypt's dynamic business innovator, Tal'at Harb, who endeavored to promote new directions 
in the Egyptian economy after World War I. Influenced by the German great banks of the 
nineteenth century and believing that a large-scale, heavily capitalized, and Egyptian-run bank 
could lead the country out of its economic dependence on cotton exports, Tal'at Harb founded 
the bank and used its capital to create a host of Misr companies, including in textile 
manufacturing, shipping, and air travel. Bank Misr finally crashed in 1939 after becoming 
overextended and experiencing some serious managerial failures.
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              In  Turkey,  also,  modern  entrepreneurship  appeared.  The  Republic  of  Turkey  was 
established in 1923 out of the ruins of the former Ottoman Empire, and led by the modernizing 
general, Kemal Atatürk. In the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, business had been primarily 
in the control of religious and ethnic minorities such as Greeks, Armenians and Jews, many of 
whom were killed or fled the country following traumatic events during and after World War 1. 
The new government offered subsidies and other support to aspiring entrepreneurs, and during 
the 1930s established public enterprises to drive modern economic growth and employed 
selective policies that led to the dispossessing of non-Muslim businesses. Within this context, 
Vehbi Koç was one of a new generation of Islamic Turks who began to build businesses. 
Beginning in grocery and leather, he moved into construction, securing multiple government 
contracts during the 1930s, as well as acting as a distributor for Ford automobiles. After making 
very large profits from truck importing during World War 2, a war Turkey stayed out of until just 
before the end, Koç began to build what became Turkey’s largest diversified business group 
during the post war decades.
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              These entrepreneurial pioneers across the Rest faced multiple challenges. Chinese firms, 
for example, had to deal with chronic political instability, and the Japanese military attack on the 35 
 
country after 1931. Many countries were badly affected by the Great Depression and secular 
decline in commodity prices. Building managerial competences was hard. Family businesses, as 
most of the ventures were, faced constant tensions as they grew in scale and needed expertise 
beyond the family. Often, even as nationalistic sentiments rose, local entrepreneurs simply faced 
a credibility gap even from their compatriots that they could be as competent as Western firms. 
Given the challenges, however, the catch-up of business in parts of the Rest during the interwar 
years was perhaps even more striking. 
              During the post-1945 decades a new global economy began to emerge in the capitalist 
countries of the West and Japan as trade barriers and exchange controls were lowered. However, 
much of the Rest either opted out of global capitalism, or sought to highly regulate it. As the 
European colonial empires were dismantled, there was often an aggressive reaction against the 
businesses of the former colonial power, and sometimes all foreign investment.  The relatively 
small number of expropriations without compensation until the 1970s - when a period of large-
scale expropriation began - reflected the power and determination of the United States to protect 
foreign investments, but Western countries were unable to re-establish an international legal 
regime which guaranteed the property rights of international investors.  During the 1970s 
Western ownership of much of the world’s natural resources, including oil, minerals and 
plantations, ended.  
The postwar political environment was not well-designed for the diffusion of 
entrepreneurial skills or organizational capabilities to the Rest. As political risk and government 
restrictions mounted, Western MNEs focused investment, trade and knowledge flows on other 
developed countries. These countries offered the primary markets for advanced technological 
and consumer products. In new advanced technology industries, MNEs located different parts of 36 
 
the value chain in different countries. In semi-conductors, for example, from the 1970s firms 
such as Intel placed assembly stages in developing countries, but the higher value added 
activities were located in developed countries.
93 Overall, by 1980 two-thirds of world FDI was 
located in Western Europe and North America. Britain alone hosted more foreign direct 
investment than the whole of Africa and Asia combined. Within the developing world, there was 
enormous concentration of inward FDI. In Asia, for example, most FDI was located in a handful 
of South-east Asian countries.
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This was the classic era of the large M-form corporations which served as the 
powerhouse of innovation in high technology manufacturing industries. US-based firms were 
pre-eminent in new technologies such as computers, and they typically sought to maintain 
innovation and other value-added activities within firm boundaries.
95 There was geographical 
clustering of knowledge also.  During the 1950s and 1960s an unusual convergence of 
technological skills, educational institutions, and venture capital in California’s Silicon Valley, 
combined with a pleasant climate, encouraged the emergence and clustering of numerous 
entrepreneurial firms which were to dominate innovation in many parts of the IT industry.
96 
MNEs concentrated innovation in their home countries. This may not always have been 
the case. There is aggregate evidence from patent data that the internationalization of 
technological activity by large manufacturing firms was quite extensive by the interwar years, 
but it then declined.
97 After 1945 US and Japanese firms especially did their innovation at home. 
European companies conducted more innovation in foreign laboratories, but they were located 
overwhelmingly in other European countries or the United States. The firms with the most 
dispersed innovatory technology were in “traditional” industries such as food, drink and tobacco, 
building materials and petroleum. In computers, aerospace and motor vehicles, there was a 37 
 
strong propensity to concentrate technological activities at home.
98 Few MNEs undertook basic 
R &D in developing countries. A rare exception was Unilever’s affiliate in India. In general, 
however, cutting-edge technological advanced knowledge was locked within the boundaries of 
large Western firms, or else in clusters located primarily in the United States, notably Silicon 
Valley.  
Nevertheless, there were some spillovers from MNEs in developing countries in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century. Large Western firms such as Unilever, Shell, and 
Citibank became important sources of management training in developing countries and 
important diffusers of management knowledge. The local managers recruited by these firms 
sometimes joined local firms, or launched start-ups. Unilever was at the forefront of recruiting 
“locals” to management positions in India and other developing countries from the 1950s. 
Citibank was also a large recruiter and trainer of managerial talent in developing countries.
99 
.        A second spillover came from the emulation of foreign business models. Avon, the leading 
American direct seller in beauty industry, began expanding to developing countries from the 
1950s. The model proved especially relevant to developing countries as it enabled thousands of 
women sales people to earn extra income from direct selling, and become quasi-entrepreneurs in 
the process. The evident success of the business model spawned local competitors during the 
1960s and 1970s, such as Brazil’s Natura, which grew to be Brazil’s largest beauty company.
100  
   Yet between 1945 and 1980 many countries in the Rest looked to models other than 
firms like Avon or global capitalism in general to catch up. At one extreme, the Communist 
regimes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China and elsewhere cut themselves off from 
global capitalism and sought to overcome the constraints on modern economic growth of their 
countries by making heavy investments in human capital, and by forcibly mobilizing resources to 38 
 
promote heavy industries.  This Communist model had very mixed results. There were 
significant achievements in improving educational levels and the manufacture of capital goods. 
However such overall gains were outweighed by catastrophic policies towards agriculture, the 
closing of economies to flows of international trade and knowledge, and the creation of 
institutions which distorted incentives and promoted corruption. Occasionally quasi-capitalist 
firms were permitted – East Germany allowed some quasi-Mittelstand firms in toys and musical 
instruments because of their export importance, but for the most part the institutional and cultural 
consequences of a business system based on a relationship between large-state-owned enterprises 
and central planners was negative. China’s vast and inefficient state-owned firms became a long-
term drag on that country’s economic performance.
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              At the other extreme, there were a handful of cases of developing countries which fully 
embraced global capitalism. Virtually from the state's full independence in the mid-1960s, 
Singapore had one of the most open policy regimes towards foreign MNEs anywhere in the 
world. Foreign-owned companies drove an export-led labor-intensive export strategy which 
transformed the country in three decades from a poor island state to one of the world’s richest 
countries in terms of per capita income. However the country relied on the State to develop local 
firms. A number of State-owned companies, including Singapore Airlines, became successful, 
global-competitive business enterprises. Singapore Airlines developed a competent management 
which used imaginative marketing strategies and bold investment strategies to create a world 
class airline, implausibly located in a country with no domestic air market, providing a role 
model for the much later success of airlines based in a number of Arabian Gulf states. Singapore 
was less successful at promoting private sector entrepreneurship. The water treatment company 39 
 
Hyflux, founded by female entrepreneur Olivia Lum in 1989 which had revenues of $450 million 
by 2013, was sufficiently atypical to attract constant media attention.
102 
The role of MNE’s in driving Singapore’s fast economic growth rested on rather specific 
circumstances. Singapore’s initial export strategy coincided both with the new strategies of 
MNEs in electronics and other industries to embark on policies of world-wide sourcing, and with 
anti-MNE policies in much of the rest of the developing world. It had a long tradition as a 
commercial entrepot, had a majority population of overseas Chinese with network links 
elsewhere in the region, and inherited a set of legal and other institutions from the British, and a 
wide knowledge of English. Above all the government pursued policies, including repressive 
controls over wages and political dissent, in an unusually effective fashion.
103 The level of 
authoritarianism could probably only have been achieved in a small island. 
A less successful version of this strategy was followed by neighboring Malaysia. 
Malaysia attracted vast investments from electronics companies into free trade zones established 
after 1971. This was successful in creating exports and jobs. Malaysian employment in 
electronics grew from 600 in the mid-1970s to 300,000 in 1995.  By 2000 electronics accounted 
for over a quarter of Malaysia’s manufacturing employment. However linkages with the 
surrounding economy were weak and not capable of stimulating local entrepreneurship. This 
reflected tensions within the country following racial riots between the majority Malays and 
minority ethnic Chinese in the late 1960s. The Malay-controlled government, concerned that 
foreign MNEs should not strengthen local Chinese business interests, allowed foreign companies 
to have 100 per cent ownership of o subsidiaries provided they exported their entire output, thus 
tacitly discouraging joint ventures with local firms.  During the 1980s 80 per cent of the 
intermediate products used in electronics manufacturing in the export processing zones were 40 
 
imported from abroad.  This meant that the industry imported almost as much as it exported in 
the 1980s.  Local firms supplied basic items such as cardboard boxes. Low value-added 
components - where Malaysian factories usually added only about 30 per cent of the value of the 
product - accounted for around 80 per cent of the country’s electronics sector in the 1980s.  Little 
design or R & D was undertaken in Malaysia, partly because of a shortage of graduate scientists 
and skilled technicians.
104   
Most countries fell between the Singapore and Communist models. Japan and South 
Korea developed trade and investment policy regimes which enabled their firms to access 
foreign knowledge through licensing and joint ventures, while ensuring that foreign firms were 
largely prevented from investing in their countries. In Japan, although firms such as Toyota were 
developing highly innovative management methods which would eventually enable them to 
sweep away their US competitors, they were also allowed to grow to scale behind high levels of 
tariff protection, and to export on the basis of an undervalued currency. Government policies 
were not exogenous to firms – they played a large role in lobbying governments to get the 
policies they wanted, for example, on the entry of foreign firms into Japan.
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The remarkable growth of South Korea from being one of the world’s poorest countries 
in 1960 to the home of global champion firms in a range of manufacturing industries is 
particularly striking. The story does not fit the institutional model well, for the period of 
industrial take-off coincided with a repressive military dictatorship. The regime banned trade 
unions and pursued a protectionist industrial policy which favored a small group of large family-
owned business groups known as chaebol, including Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo and Lucky-
Goldstar. It was not the protection of property rights or constrained executives which promoted 
growth, but “good for growth” dictators. 41 
 
   The chaebol were the principal forces behind South Korean rapid growth as a major 
force in electronics and automobiles. Hyundai, until its break up in 2001, was the largest 
chaebol. The firm was founded by Chung Ju-yung in 1947 as a construction firm, and Chung 
remained directly in control of the company until his death in 2001. From a humble beginning, 
the firm grew rapidly, entering automobiles from the 1960s, shipbuilding from the 1970s, and 
electronics from the 1980s. Each stage of growth was shaped by government policy, which 
provided timely assistance in terms of favorable financing, and domestic market protection. In 
return, Hyundai built new factories, provided desperately needed jobs, and earned valuable 
foreign exchange by exporting. Widely condemned as crony capitalism after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, the system also delivered fast economic growth rates over decades and world-
class firms.
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     In many other developing countries, governments intervened to enable their countries 
to modernize. There were major, and frequently under-estimated, advances in literacy rates, 
which were very low at the end of the colonial period in most of Asia and Africa, and in 
women’s political and other rights. Industrial policies were less successful.  Many  long-
established locally-owned business sectors were destroyed in the new era of state planning and 
controls. The process could be seen at a micro level in the case of the Bolivan tin industry. 
Before 1914 the Bolivian entrepreneur Simon Patiño displaced the foreign companies which had 
initially developed the Bolivian industry to become the largest Bolivian producer of tin 
concentrates.  This output was at first sold to smelters in Britain and Germany. In 1916 Patiño 
secured control of the British smelter. The high physical asset specificity of the smelters required 
to deal with Bolivia's lode ores provided an incentive for this strategy.  In 1929 Patiño also 
obtained control of one of the two Malaya smelters. Patino himself moved abroad during the 42 
 
1920s, registering his main corporate vehicle in the United States, possibly to raise capital.   
During the 1930s he formed one of three companies which accounted for almost half of the 
world's mining and tin smelting outside the Soviet Union, and he was prominent in forming the 
long-standing tin cartel. But in 1952 Bolivia became the first country to take over its tin industry. 
Although the Patiño group remained important in the marketing and smelting of tin, it was 
fragmented because of the loss of ownership of the mines.
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The same phenomenon was evident in Africa. By the 1960s the large-scale private sector 
in Egypt had been entirely dismantled. Nigeria’s business communities, which had appeared as 
dynamic forces in the postwar decades, became engaged in ethnic and regional rivalry that drew 
business. In Africa, the most successful firms were seen in South Africa, which underwent fast 
economic growth between 1950 and 1973. However, these firms grew in the context of the 
institutionalized racism in the form of the apartheid system adopted after 1948. This forced 
millions of blacks forced off their farms and urban areas, denying them education. These decades 
saw the creation of giant industrial groups, often closely linked to the government, although the 
economy as a whole began to experience poor performance from the 1970s.
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In many developing countries, state intervention continued to encourage local 
entrepreneurs to grow large businesses using political contacts rather than technological 
capabilities. This did not necessarily prevent the creation of large firms, although it usually 
provided a weak foundation for international competitiveness. An example might be the Chareon 
Pokhad (CP) Group, which became the largest Thai-owned MNE. It was founded in 1921 by 
recent emigrants from China as a small venture selling imported vegetable seeds. It became a 
major animal feeds manufacturer after World War 2. In 1971 a joint venture with a leading US 
poultry breeding firm became the basis for the creation of a modern integrated chicken business 43 
 
in Thailand. Further diversification followed into real estate and retailing, often through joint 
ventures with Western firms. However the firm’s major growth in telecommunications was 
achieved through CP’s close contacts with leading Thai politicians, while its rapid growth in 
China after 1979 – where it became one of the largest foreign investors – was based on strong 
ethnic ties.
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            There  is  general  agreement  that import substitution regimes of this era resulted in 
inefficient industries which were sheltered from international markets, and often burdened by 
webs of planning regulations and corruption. Yet capacities were created, albeit inefficient ones. 
Take the case of Brazil. In the early 1950s Brazil still only the beginnings of an industrial base. 
Virtually all the motor vehicles used in Brazil were imported as knocked-down kits and 
assembled locally. During the second half of the 1950s an industrial policy was pursued which 
threatened assemblers with market closure if they did not manufacture locally. Even more critical 
was the policy towards the level of local content which meant that firms were forced to produce 
the “technological heart” of their vehicles in Brazil, which was definitely not on their agenda. 
Although the large US automobile manufacturers Ford and General Motors initially declined to 
commit themselves, Germany’s Volkswagen, which was just embarking on global expansion, 
decided to begin making its Beetle car. By 1968 eight foreign firms manufactured 280,000 
vehicles in the country. A further surge of growth resulted in annual production of over one 
million vehicles by 1980. The level of protectionism had resulted in low productivity, and it was 
entirely foreign-owned as early ambitions that a locally-owned industry would develop did not 
come to fruition. Still, Brazil had acquired the tenth largest automobile industry in the world.
110 
           It  would  also  appear  that  import  substitution  regimes  provided  local  firms  with 
opportunities to achieve scale within their domestic markets. Cemex, now the world’s third 44 
 
largest cement company, was founded in Mexico in 1906, and was able to grow in a rather 
sheltered environment slowly becoming a regional player and then, in the 1970s, a national 
player. 
            In India, the era of the so-called “License Raj” also enabled firms to grow within their 
domestic market. Arguably, it laid the basis for the country’s subsequently successful IT services 
sector. Postwar India had growing numbers of engineers owing to the many national institutes, 
engineering universities and regional colleges established after 1947. However, it had little 
choice to be totally dependent on US computer makers. During the 1960s and 1970s a handful of 
locally-owned firms were established to develop and run applications software for Indian 
companies and research institutions that had brought or leased mainframes from IBM and other 
US companies. Tata, which had remained India’s largest business group, established the first of 
these firms, Tata Consulting Services in 1968. This and other ventures remained small, however, 
until 1977, when, after the Indian government tightened the laws on foreign ownership of firms, 
IBM and other US firms divested. 
             The  departure  of  IBM  opened new opportunities for local firms. TCS developed a 
relationship with another US computer maker, Burroughs, which provided an important channel 
of new technology. In 1982 the start-up Infosys was founded by the dynamic entrepreneur 
Narayana Murthy. The Indian firms built a strong trade association, NASSCOM, which sought to 
enhance and certify the quality of Indian firms. By the time policy regulation got underway in 
1991, which gave Indian IT firms a freer hand in establishing marketing offices abroad and 
serving foreign clients, it had built strong organizational capabilities. The software industry 
became focused on Bangalore, where the British had established India’s first aircraft factory 
during World War 2, and which was the home of two of India’s premier institutes of higher 45 
 
education in pure science. Like Silicon Valley, there was also a pleasant climate, at least before 
pollution began to increase. The government’s establishment of a Software Technology Park, or 
export zone, in Bangalore in 1990, and an influx of expertise and contracts from the many 
expatriate Indians employed in Silicon Valley, were other influential factors in the growth of the 
Bangalore cluster.
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            A similar tale could be told about other Indian industries. Both long-established business 
groups and new entrepreneurial firms were able to emerge in the Import Substitution era, despite 
the formidable battery of government controls and restrictions, and despite a considerable 
number of firms experiencing problems because of family succession issues. The highly 
protected domestic market itself created profitable opportunities for incumbents, although a 
serious-trade off was a widespread spread of corruption. Many new business groups were 
created, including by Marwari families such as the Goenkas and Khaitans, who built business 
groups by acquiring former British assets. Although the productively and effectiveness of Indian 
firms was highly constrained by planning controls and other bureaucratic obstacles, therefore, 
once policies were changed after 1991 they had the scale to expand rapidly. It was a different 
legacy from the state-owned companies in China. 
               The era of constrained globalization, then, was challenging for the catch up of the Rest. 
During the interwar years there were significant examples of strong locally-owned business 
enterprises developing in India, China, Egypt and elsewhere. After World War 2, many 
governments opted for state-led industrialization programs which frequently disrupted local 
firms, whilst blocking or discouraging foreign MNEs. Protectionism and restrictions on foreign 
firms did provide a context for new local firms to emerge, although these policies also provided 
incentives for firms to build skills in political contacts rather than technology. The growth of 46 
 
some of the larger business enterprises in the Rest, such as the South Korean chaebol and large 
South African corporations, took place in the context of authoritarian and repressive regimes, far 
removed in most respects from the institutional arrangements postulated by North and others as 
best for capitalist development. 
             By 1980 the gap in income levels between the rich nations and the Rest was bigger than 
in 1914. Japan was the only case of a spectacular catch up, with a number of other smaller East 
and south-east Asian economies following at a distance. Elsewhere, state interventionist regimes 
had encountered growing problems of macro-economic instability and hyper-inflation by the 
1970s. These problems provided the background for the shift back to liberal polices beginning in 
the following decade. 
 Second Global Economy 
The world spectacularly re-globalized from the 1980s, even if in some respects – such as 
immigration – it remains less globalized than before 1914. Among the most dramatic changes 
has been a worldwide policy embrace of global capitalism as emerging markets countries 
abandoned state planning and import substitution and sought export-led growth.   
The fast economic growth seen in China and India, and certain other regions of the Rest 
also, provide strong support for Baumol’s argument that shifts in the rules of the game can 
stimulate productive entrepreneurship. It is, once more, less supportive of the institutional 
argument. China’s resurgence began under another good for growth dictator, Deng Xiaoping, 
who had little concern with controls over the executive, human rights, political rights or 
intellectual property protection. In some respects, however, China is a showcase for the 
transforming impact of global capitalism, as foreign firms played a key role in starting China’s 47 
 
economic growth, and accounted for a high percentage of China’s exports. By the 1990s inward 
FDI accounted for 13 per cent of gross domestic capital formation in China.
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Debates continue how exactly China’s experience should be interpreted. Huang argued 
nearly a decade ago that it said as much about the highly inefficient domestic firms which failed 
to capitalize on opportunities, in part because of continuing government interference in the 
allocation of financial resources, than it did about the transforming impact of global 
capitalism.
113 It is less evident that this argument can be sustained more recently given the 
growing global competitiveness of a cluster of Chinese firms, often state-owned. For a time there 
appeared to be an interesting “natural experiment” with Asia’s two largest economies. While 
China embraced FDI, India made a mirror-image choice. Foreign companies played only a 
limited role in the Indian economy, while powerful globally competitive firms developed. 
However, more recently, there has been more inward investment in India than previously. 
While MNEs played a dynamic role in China’s economic growth, as they had earlier for 
Singapore, it is less apparent that this was a general phenomenon. Policy regimes everywhere 
shifted towards openness, and many countries started to offer incentives to MNEs to invest, 
rather than passing laws to block them. However, most research on the impact of foreign MNEs 
was sobering. There remained little or no aggregate evidence of spillovers from MNE to local 
firms in the same sector, especially in developing countries. There was convincing evidence of 
positive linkages between MNEs and suppliers in many developing countries. Foreign affiliates 
were often more demanding in their specifications and delivery targets, while more willing to 
provide assistance and advice to local firms.
114 However in countries where export-oriented FDI 
was concentrated within free trade zones, linkages with local firms were often been weak.   48 
 
MNEs needed to cross the 'border' in order to source locally, and they often preferred to source 
in neighboring countries. 
One explanation for limited spillovers was that MNEs had clear incentives to minimize 
leakages to real or potential competitors. In many developing countries local firms also 
continued to lack the capabilities to compete with large MNEs, and the greater the technology 
gap, the more difficult this gap was to fill.  In branded consumer goods, such as cosmetics, 
foreign entry often resulted in local firms retreating into the lower end of the market, competing 
on cost rather than innovation. Research increasingly suggests that large MNEs struggled even 
with transferring organizational knowledge across borders even within their own firm. As such 
corporations grew in complexity, the organizational obstacles to knowledge diffusion may have 
expanded.
115 
Nor was there evidence that MNEs were any more able, or willing, to change growth–
restricting institutions. For example, the development of business in many of the poorest 
countries is handicapped by high corruption levels.  Before the 1980s many MNEs probably 
contributed to these corruption levels. More recently, most have been less willing than local 
firms to engage in bribery and tax evasion, in part because of the threat to corporate reputation as 
well as home country regulations such as the Corrupt Practices Act in the United States, but they 
do not have the capacity to change societal norms for the most part.  In important markets, 
foreign firms typically will lend support to institutional norms, as seen in the willingness of US 
firms such as Cisco, the internet networking company, to facilitate the Chinese government’s 
censorship of the internet and curbing of political dissent.
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A further limitation on the impact of MNEs was that as firms moved resources across 
borders in pursuit of profitable opportunities, not social good per se, they were more likely to 49 
 
reinforce trends than counter them. Despite the availability of technologies which permit the 
dispersal of economic activities, the second global economy saw a strong trend towards the 
geographical clustering of higher value-added activities, whether they be Silicon Valley, 
Bangalore, the City of London, or coastal regions of China. 
In some instances, especially where the knowledge component of activities was not great, 
MNE strategies were footloose as a result. The experience of Mexico’s maquiladoras – foreign-
owned factories that assemble imported components for export – provided one example. These 
originated in 1965, when the United States and Mexico started a Border Industrialization 
Program, designed to reduce regional unemployment in the northern territories of Mexico. US-
owned firms including GE, RCA, IBM, Coca-Cola and Ford were the first to locate their 
production in Mexico. There was a rapid growth of production following the 1982 Mexican debt 
crisis, when wage rates fell sharply. Employment in the maquiladoras rose from 100,000 in 1982 
to 500,000 in 1992. The implementation of NAFTA in 1994 resulted in a further boost. By 2000 
employment had reached 1.3 million, and the sector accounted for over 40 per cent of total 
Mexican exports. However there were two downsides. First of all, there were practically no 
Mexican spin-offs from all this investment. Secondly, the investment was vulnerable to greater 
attractions elsewhere. Between 2001 and 2004 employment the Mexican maquiladoras fell by 
200,000 as firms shifted factories to China, although rising wage costs in China substantially 
reversed this trend over the following decade. 
Nevertheless, certain aspects of global capitalism evolved in ways which delivered more 
opportunities for firms and entrepreneurs based in the Rest. An important development was the 
disintegration of the boundaries of M-form firms during the 1970s and 1980s, as many large US 
and European-owned M-form corporations suffered from growing managerial diseconomies and 50 
 
low rates of innovation caused by size and diversification. The result was divestment of “non-
core” businesses, outsourcing of many value-added activities once performed within corporate 
borders, and the formation of alliances with other firms which acted as suppliers and customers, 
or as partners in innovation. The second global economy became complex than previously as a 
result. While large corporations remained powerhouses of innovation spending and market 
power, they formed components of a worldwide web of inter-firm connections.  
              The disintegration of production systems and their replacement by networks of inter-
firm linkages lowered barriers for new entrants through. The growth of outsourcing to contract 
manufacturers, for example, created many opportunities for new entrants. In China, networks of 
small and medium-sized enterprises flourished as original equipment manufacturers, establishing 
influential positions in world supply chains in fields of low or mid-level technology. The growth 
of Galanz was one example. Founded in 1978 as a company that dealt in the trading of duck 
feathers, Galanz began producing OEM Toshiba-branded microwave ovens in 1993. Galanz later 
purchased the appliance division from Toshiba. By the following decade Galanz had become the 
world’s largest microwave manufacturer. Within a network-type global economy, firms from 
emerging markets were able to piggy back on incumbent Western or Japanese firms as customers 
through subcontracting, linkages and leverages. Although they lacked the size and technological 
capabilities of incumbents there was the potential to grow through leveraging resources from 
others through joint ventures and contract relationships.
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           If  a  major  constraint  for  firms based in the Rest was not only the existence of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, but also the building of organizational capabilities to exploit them, 51 
 
then a number of developments during the second global economy alleviated this challenge, and 
facilitated “accelerated internationalization.”
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          First,  diaspora  assumed  a  renewed  importance as transferors of entrepreneurship and 
capital, and means by which firms could access management talent. The revitalized use of 
diaspora reflected changes in policies in China and India especially made them more attractive 
locations to do business, encouraging diaspora to return. After 1980, ethnic Chinese firms based 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and later elsewhere, became the leading foreign investors as China 
liberalized its economy. They enjoyed connections (guanxi) in China, which reduced the 
transactions costs of investment by offering contacts with public authorities and inside 
information, and were welcomed by the Chinese government.  
During the 1990s the Indian diaspora  began to serve the same function in India. 
Although the Indian diaspora had its origins in the nineteenth century, when merchants and 
laborers had emigrated to other parts of Asia and Africa under the umbrella of the British 
Empire, a professional diaspora left India during the 1960s, often to the United States, seeking 
greater economic opportunities. Many engineers settled in Silicon Valley and made up a quarter 
of the workforce by the 1990s. As the Indian economy grew from the 1990s, there has been a 
significant reverse flow back to India. This was assisted by the Indian government’s new policy 
in 2003 of granting dual nationality to some overseas Indian residents abroad. These diaspora 
links provided valuable connections between Silicon Valley and Bangalore, encouraging 
business connections and capital flows.
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           Secondly,  both  business  schools  and management consultants provided much easier 
access to new management knowledge, and they have played important roles in building 52 
 
organizational capabilities in firms. In postwar Europe both US management consultancies and 
business schools were influential diffusers of American managerial knowledge to Europe and 
other developed countries. The impact on emerging markets only became stronger later. 
McKinsey opened in India in 1992. From the 1990s leading US business schools have 
internationalized their faculty and student body. During the 1950s and 1960s, although the 
Harvard Business School helped develop business schools in Turkey, India, Nicaragua and the 
Philippines, it remained primarily an American school in its ethos and teaching. However the 
percentage of US-born faculty decreased from 75 per cent in 1980 to 66 per cent in 2000. The 
student body moved from being almost entirely white American males in the 1950s, to being one 
third international in 2000.  
Many of the most successful companies from emerging markets hired the leading US 
consulting firms for advice on strategy, sent senior managers on executive programs at the top 
business schools, and recruited MBAs as graduates. None of this meant that such firms evolved 
as replicas of US firms, but it did mean that they had faster and better access to information 
about the latest managerial ideas in ways which were impossible fifty years ago. 
            It  is  possible  to  see  the  influence of such conduits of managerial knowledge on the 
growth of global firms based in emerging markets such as CEMEX. After the 1980s the firm 
began to diversify from Mexico following the appointment of a new generation of the Zambrano 
family. Lorenzo Zambrano, the architect of a new international strategy, had been educated at 
Stanford Business School, and sought strategy advice from Boston Consulting Group. 
Responding to Mexican economic crisis, CEMEX began to expand internationally, initially in 
the US, but when blocked by anti-dumping judgment, to Europe. Cemex was a leading user of 
information technology. In 1987 Cemex created a satellite system to link the Mexican plants it 53 
 
hand begun to acquire. By the late 1990s it ranked as the third most profitable company in the 
world, and was the third largest cement company after Holderbank and Lafarge. By the 
following decade it was the largest cement company in the United States.
120 
A final, important, factor in the growth of MNEs from some emerging markets has 
support from their host governments. Both the nature and motives of this support has varied 
widely. Emerging market governments sought to intervene in many ways to help their firms 
overcome the information, transaction and resource constraints faced by their domestic firms.
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Some governments, including China, used state-owned firms as national champions to pursue 
strategic objectives.
122 As governments from emerging markets often established ties with 
governments of other emerging countries, firms sometimes leveraged these contacts to facilitate 
their international growth.
123 In many countries, firms formed contacts and associations at 
multiple levels of their home economy: city, provincial and national.
124 This smart state 
capitalism differed from its post-war predecessor in being combined with competent 
management and execution, as well as being much more connected with the global economy. 
            The opportunities from a network-style world economy, the growth of organizational 
capabilities, and smarter government policies were not discrete factors in the growth of the new 
generation of MNEs based in emerging markets.  These factors often combined to spur the 
growth of individual firms.  This was evident in the growth of the internet router company 
Huawei Technologies, which was established in 1988 in the Shenzhen economic zone of China 
by Ren Zhengfei, a former major in the People’s Liberation Army. It began as a start-up small 
selling telephone-exchange equipment imported from Hong Kong, but grew rapidly after it 
began to make telecom equipment in the mid-1990s. By the new century it had become a leading 54 
 
supplier of digital switches and routers in China, and had secured 3 per cent of the world market 
for routers by producing equipment at lower prices than its Western competitors.  
           The  firm’s  initial  growth  was  facilitated by the founder’s close association with the 
People’s Liberation Army and credit from the state-owned development bank. Wireless 
networking was a strategic industry for the Chinese government, not least because the equipment 
was the hardware which enabled the government to censor information and monitor activity on 
the internet. However Huawei’s growth was not a simple story of growth based on political 
contacts and support. Ren Zhengfei implemented a clever strategy of building businesses in 
remoter and outlying cities in China before targeting the major cities where Cisco and others had 
built a market since the 1990s. He then repeated the strategy globally, first selling to countries 
like Russia, Brazil and Thailand, before moving to more advanced markets, especially in Europe. 
Huawei also invested heavily in research, creating research centers in numerous locations around 
the world including Bangalore and Silicon Valley. Innovation was supported by an aggressive 
corporate culture which rewarded talent. The firm also benefitted from alliances with Western 
firms, with whom it collaborated as well as competed. In 2003 Huawei formed a joint venture 
with 3Com, then a leading US-owned router firm, designed to facilitate sales to US corporate 
customers. In 2007 Bain Capital, the private equity firm, and Huawei reached an agreement to 
acquire 3Com altogether for $2.2 billion, but this was blocked by opposition by the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States, an agency chaired by the Secretary of the 
Treasury.
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 Although the US government continued to hinder Huawei’s growth in the United 
States, this did not prevent fast global expansion elsewhere. By 2012 Huawei was a $32 billion 
company active in 140 countries, selling high-end internet networking equipment.
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           The growth of powerful globally active MNEs from the Rest was a singular feature of the 
second global economy. There was no single driver, and it was not simply the result of policy 
liberalization. The new sources of knowledge acquisition provided by business schools and 
management consultancies, returning diaspora, smart state capitalism, and the changing nature of 
the global economy all contributed to a story which looks set to become one of the major shifts 
in world business history. Huawei and Cemex were tips of a growing iceberg of emerging market 
giants such as Tata in India, Brahma, Embraer, Sabó, and Aracruz in Brazil, Grupo Bimbo and 
Univision in Mexico.
127 In more aggregate terms, the share of FDI from emerging markets in 
total outward FDI rose from 8.3 per cent to 15.9 per cent between 1990 and 2009.
128 
Conclusion 
This working paper has sought to integrate the role of entrepreneurship and firms into 
debates on why the Rest was slow to catch up with the West following the Industrial Revolution 
and the advent of modern economic growth.  
It was been suggested that poor human capital development and deficient institutions are 
important, but not sufficient, explanations. The emphasis on national-level institutions seems 
particularly unhelpful given strong regional variations in business activities between countries. 
The impact of institutions on the allocation of entrepreneurship between productive and 
redistributive activities takes the analysis to a deeper level, without entirely solving the problem, 
as the slow development of modern business in colonial India, and its skewed ownership, 
indicates. Entrepreneurs were also actors and not simply responders to institutions and resource 
endowments. They could train their own workers and they introduce investor protection into 
their own byelaws. 56 
 
            It is evident that once the process of modern economic growth had started catch-up was 
surprisingly difficult in much of the Rest, if less so neighboring regions of the original North Sea 
industrializers. The societal and cultural embeddedness of new technologies posed significant 
entrepreneurial challenges in the Rest. The best equipped to overcome these challenges were 
often entrepreneurs based in minorities who held significant advantages in capital-raising and 
trust levels. They often also benefitted from a greater willingness to engage with Western firms 
and colonial governments.  Generally, as the first global economy got underway, MNEs proved 
important facilitators of globalization, but they were a disappointing diffuser of organizational 
skills and information to the Rest, and had limited importance in relieving the institutional, 
human capital or other constraints faced by many local entrepreneurs. 
      By the interwar years there is considerable evidence of productive modern 
entrepreneurship and business enterprise emerging across Asia, Latin America and even Africa. 
Japan was a spectacular case of a more general process. This generation of entrepreneurs were 
sometimes facilitated by nationalistic governments and sentiments, and in China and elsewhere 
they were quite effective combining local and Western practices to produce hybrid forms of 
business enterprise. However many governmental policies after 1945 designed to facilitate catch-
up ended up crippling emergent business enterprises without putting an effective alternatives in 
place. They were too inward looking, and too inclined to incentivize inefficiency and corruption 
rather than innovation. Many policy regimes ended up favouring redistributive rather than 
productive entrepreneurship, although it was noteworthy that they also provided some shelter for 
local firms to develop without being crippled by competition from the West. Individual 
businesses had the agency either to invest in managerial and technological competences in this 57 
 
era, or alternatively focus on rent-seeking, but the rules of the game often made the first path the 
easier one. 
   The second global economy provided more opportunities for catch up from the Rest. 
Firms from emerging markets had the opportunity to access the global networks which, in part, 
replaced large integrated firms. There were new ways for firms in the Rest to access knowledge 
and capital, including returning diaspora, business schools and management consultancies. Smart 
state capitalism was a far greater source of international competitive advantage than the state 
intervention of the past, even if many government policies were not smart and continued to offer 
incentives for rent-seeking.  
           The  rapid  international  growth  of MNEs based in emerging markets was a striking 
departure from the past. However global capitalism also remained a system which rewarded 
winners, and facilitated clustering in favoured locations. Innovation remained heavily clustered 
in the advanced countries, especially the United States. Western and Japanese firms have 
powerful incumbency advantages. Falling tariff and other barriers meant that a new generation of 
firms based in the Rest might even find it harder to reach scale than their predecessors who could 
grow in the much-derided era of import substitution.    
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